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Honorable Christopher C. Conner, United States District Judge for the Middle*
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
      NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-1206
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
DERRICK STEPLIGHT, 
                                             Appellant.
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 06-cr-00349)
District Judge: Honorable Bruce W. Kauffman
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on January 25, 2010
Before: FUENTES and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and CONNER,  District Judge.*
(Opinion Filed: February 24, 2010)
OPINION OF THE COURT
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction1
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
2
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Following a trial by jury, Appellant Derrick Steplight was convicted on November
13, 2006 of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  On
January 19, 2007, Steplight was sentenced to 204 months imprisonment and five years
supervised release and fined $1,500.  Steplight filed a timely notice of appeal and was
appointed counsel.  His appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw representation
and has submitted a supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967).  We will allow the motion to withdraw and will affirm Steplight’s plea and
sentence.1
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we only discuss the facts and
proceedings to the extent necessary for resolution of this case.  Appellant Derrick
Steplight was pulled over when officers suspected his car was in violation of a
Pennsylvania law prohibiting excessive window tinting.  One of the uniformed police
officers who pulled his car over testified that, when asked to produce his license and
registration, Steplight covered his waist with his hand.  The officer believed Steplight was
possibly hiding a weapon and asked him to step out of the car.  Steplight instead drove
off.  He and his passenger, his nephew Shamir Steplight, subsequently abandoned the car
3and fled on foot.  According to the arresting police officer, each of them threw a gun on
the ground as he ran.  They were both apprehended and arrested for unlawful possession
of a firearm.  Appellant was subsequently indicted in federal court on the charge of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 
Steplight’s motion to suppress evidence, namely the firearm attributed to him, was
denied and he was found guilty after a jury trial.  The District Court granted a downward
variance from the guidelines range of 235-293 months and sentenced him to 204 months
in prison, five years supervised release, and a $1,500 fine and imposed a $100 special
assessment.  The court also granted Steplight’s retained trial counsel’s motion to
withdraw.  
II.
Steplight’s appointed attorney, Michael J. Kelly, has filed a motion to withdraw
and, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), has prepared a brief in
support of this motion.  See Third Circuit Rule 109.2(a) (outlining process for considering
a motion to withdraw representation).  Under Anders, “if counsel finds his case to be
wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it” he may be granted permission to
withdraw after advising the court of this and submitting “a brief referring to anything in
the record that might arguably support the appeal.”  386 U.S. at 744.  The court must then
conduct its own “full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is
wholly frivolous.”  Id.  
4We have outlined a two-step inquiry that must be completed when counsel submits
an Anders brief: “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the [Third Circuit] rule’s
requirements; and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any
nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  We
“confine our scrutiny of the record to those portions of the record identified by an
adequate Anders brief . . . [and] those issues raised in Appellant’s pro se brief.”  Id. at
301.  Counsel’s brief was properly served upon Steplight, who was entitled to file his own
pro se brief in response.  Steplight did not do so.  The Government, as required, filed a
brief in response, supporting counsel’s motion to withdraw.       
In preparing his Anders brief, Steplight’s attorney conducted a thorough
examination of the record to determine whether there were any non-frivolous issues for
appeal.  See id. (“The duties of counsel when preparing an Anders brief are (1) to satisfy
the court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues,
and (2) to explain why the issues are frivolous.”).  Counsel’s brief discussed three
possible issues for appeal and adequately explained why each lacked merit: (1) whether
sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the jury’s verdict; (2) whether the
District Court erred in denying Steplight’s motion to suppress; and (3) whether there were
any sentencing errors. 
Having independently examined the issues raised by Steplight’s counsel, we agree
that they lack merit and that no non-frivolous issues for appeal exist.  First, we cannot say
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find Steplight
5guilty.  The parties stipulated at trial to two of the three elements of unlawful possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon.  Specifically, they stipulated that Steplight was
convicted of a felony and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.  The final
element of the crime was Steplight’s possession of the firearm.  The two police officers
who pulled over and arrested Steplight testified that they saw him throw a firearm to the
ground as he ran away and that they immediately recovered it.  Contrary testimony was
presented from a neighbor and from Shamir Steplight.  The latter testimony was rebutted
by Shamir Steplight’s parole officer, who testified that he had told her that his family was
pressuring him to take responsibility for the firearm his uncle was charged with
possessing.  No evidence was presented that would discredit the police officers’
testimony.
An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a “very heavy
burden.”  United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 657 (3d Cir. 2006).  “[W]e must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government and will sustain the verdict if any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).  Given the police officer’s testimony, the jury clearly
had a reasonable basis for finding that Steplight possessed the firearm, the only non-
stipulated element of the charged crime.  Accordingly, we agree that there is no non-
frivolous basis for claiming that the evidence was insufficient.    
6Second, the District Court did not err in refusing to grant the motion to suppress,
which argued that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Steplight’s car and had
no right to order him to step out of his car.  See United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d
392, 397 (2006) (holding that “reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic
stops”).   
 Steplight acknowledged during his testimony at the suppression hearing that the
backseat windows of his car were tinted.  He argued that another officer – who had
previously pulled him over for excessive tinting, causing him to remove the tinting on the
front windows – led him to believe that the remaining tinting, on the rear windows, was
not illegal.  This argument, that only the rear windows were tinted, does not render
unreasonable the officers’ decision to stop Steplight because they believed his tinting to
be illegal.  In light of the arguments made at the suppression hearing, as well as
Steplight’s concession that his rear windows were tinted, we find that no non-frivolous
argument can be made that the District Court erred in finding the police had reasonable
suspicion to stop his car.  
Nor do we find any basis for finding error in the District Court’s conclusion that
the police officers had a sufficient basis for ordering him to step out of the car, an order
based upon the police officer’s suspicion that Steplight was concealing a weapon.  A
police officer executing a lawful traffic stop “may exercise reasonable superintendence
over the car and its passengers” and “may order the driver out of the vehicle without any
particularized suspicion.”  United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004). 
7Accordingly, there is no non-frivolous claim regarding the District Court’s ruling on this
issue. 
As for the third and final issue identified in the Anders brief, there is no non-
frivolous basis for challenging Steplight’s sentencing.  The District Court followed the
three-step sentencing process we outlined in United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d
Cir. 2006).  A court must (1) calculate the Guidelines sentence; (2) rule on any motions
for departure, stating the basis for its decisions; and (3) consider the factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) to determine whether to exercise its discretion and grant a variance.  A review
of the sentencing transcript indicates the District Court carefully followed this procedure.  
Due to his prior convictions, Steplight faced a mandatory minimum of 15 years (180
months).  His guideline range was 235 to 293 months.  The court granted a downward
variance and sentenced him to 204 months incarceration.  We find no basis for arguing
this sentence was unreasonable.      
For the foregoing reasons, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm
Steplight’s conviction and the sentence imposed by the District Court.
